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 Introduction
I n a paper published in 2002, Canadian Air Force officer Paul Johnston asserted that “[i]t has been widely observed that air forc-
es are usually not as keen on doctrine as armies 
tend to be, and the Canadian Forces are cer-
tainly no exception to this rule.”1 In the same 
year, Aerospace Doctrine Study: Final Report 
reached a similar conclusion: “Historically the 
Canadian air force has been weak in doctrinal 
development; very little original, independent 
air force…doctrine has been written.”2
As discussion herein will postulate, the 
culture of the Canadian Air Force, like most 
other Western air forces, has not been tradi-
tionally characterised by a tendency towards 
theoretical or doctrinal development. Instead, 
an oral (rather than written) culture of passing 
lessons from senior to junior officers evolved 
early in the history of the Canadian Air Force 
and subsequently became entrenched. This was 
accompanied by a tendency to pragmatically fo-
cus on contemporary issues, to the detriment of 
broader theoretical and doctrinal development.
Among the small number of studies that 
have hitherto been undertaken in an effort 
to explain why such a culture has developed 
within other air forces, Robert Futrell’s study 
of United States Air Force (USAF) culture 
is probably the best known. Futrell suggested 
that from the outset, the nature of air forces 
tended to attract people with an “active” rather 
than a “literary” focus. During the early years of 
their existence, when air force culture was still 
emerging, the heavy criticism early air power 
theorists attracted (especially from within 
armies and navies) greatly exacerbated the 
existing propensity of most airmen to eschew 
written theories and doctrines.3
Recently, however, there have been some 
indications that the Canadian Air Force is 
beginning to shift away from this traditional 
cultural paradigm and that a tentative culture 
of doctrinal development is emerging to take 
its place. By 2007—a mere five years after 
Johnston and the Aerospace Doctrine Study made 
the assertions quoted above—the Canadian Air 
Force had established an organisation respon-
sible for doctrine development4 and released an 
innovative new doctrine manual.5
This is the first of two articles that examine 
the origin, evolution and future potential of this 
cultural shift. It begins by briefly examining 
the nature of air power theory and doctrine 
as well as the relationship between them. It 
then offers an overview of the role theory and 
doctrine have traditionally played within the 
culture of Western air forces generally and then 
examines the dissonance between doctrine and 
Canadian Air Force culture during the cold 
war. Drawing on this background, the second 
article will examine the Canadian Air Force’s 
attempts to develop doctrine in the period after 
1975, concentrating particularly on the nature, 
significance and future potential of events of 
the past five years.
The	Nature	of	Air	Power	Theory	
and doctrine
From the outset, it must be made clear 
that “military thought and doctrine are not 
synonymous.”6 Although military theory (and 
several prominent theorists) have influenced 
military conduct for centuries, theory is not 
doctrine because “[t]he first is personal, the 
latter institutional.”7 Despite this difference, 
both theory and doctrine play important roles 
in the intellectual development of military 
organisations, and both warrant brief discussion 
at this juncture.
Theory is important because it plays a 
vital role in developing an understanding of 
why events occur, promoting deeper percep-
tions than simple historical or contemporary 
observations can offer. In the words of Prussian 
military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, theory 
“can give the mind insight into the great mass 
of phenomena and of their relationships, then 
leave it free to rise into the higher realms of ac-
tion.”8 This sentiment was perhaps more clearly 
explained by Samuel P. Huntington:
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Understanding	requires	theory;	
theory	requires	abstraction;	and	ab-
straction	requires	the	simplification	
and	ordering	of	reality…	Obviously,	
the	real	world	is	one	of	blends,	
irrationalities,	and	incongruities:	
actual	personalities,	institutions,	
and	beliefs	do	not	fit	into	neat	
logical	categories.	Yet	neat	logical	
categories	are	necessary	if	man	is	
to	think	profitably	about	the	real	
world	in	which	he	lives	and	to	derive	
from	it	lessons	for	broader	applica-
tion and use.9
For air forces, the development of theory 
has provided a mechanism to allow them to 
reach a deeper level of understanding about 
what they do as well as how and why they do it. 
From this deeper understanding, guidance can 
then be derived to enable air forces to operate 
more effectively.
Doctrine, on the other hand, acts as an 
institutional mechanism that militaries have 
traditionally used to express the acceptance of 
selected theories and concepts. In the words of 
one United States Army Air Force staff officer, 
doctrine is important because:
In any field of endeavour, private 
or public, the first essential is a body of 
working principles and the next is a clear 
concept of the manner of following those 
principles with the means at hand. Without 
such principles and concepts being clearly 
expressed, at least in the minds of the users, 
it is not at all possible to attain coordination 
and efficiency, and it is not reasonable to 
expect, as is desirable, that all workers to 
the common end will have in mind the 
same possibilities and objectives. In military 
matters…where mistakes and inconsisten-
cies cost thousands of lives and millions of 
man-hours, it is all the more important that 
there be clearly expressed guiding principles 
which are clearly understood by all plan-
ners, as well as by all who are charged with 
the handling of forces in the field.10
For air forces, doctrine has an important 
role to play in ensuring unity of purpose is 
achieved. It does this by formally establishing a 
set of principles that provide guidance for the 
conduct of operations.
The ideal relationship between theory and 
doctrine is thus a symbiotic one. As Markus 
Mader observed in his study of post-cold war 
British military doctrine development:
Doctrine is more than the formal 
publication of military concepts. It stands 
for an institutional culture of conceptual 
thinking on the nature of conflict and the 
best conduct of warfare. It is the military’s 
instrument for analysing past experience, 
guiding current operations and exploring 
future challenges.11
To ensure doctrine is a meaningful instru-
ment in this regard, the principles espoused 
within it must be based upon a sound theo-
retical framework. This allows for a synthesis 
between the unity of purpose established 
by doctrine and the deeper understanding 
established by theory. In other words, the 
incorporation of theoretical perspectives allows 
doctrine to have a deeper significance than 
merely enabling those within a military force to 
“sing from the same song sheet.”
As will be discussed in the second part of 
this article, the strength (or weakness) of the 
link between theory and doctrine has been a 
vital determinant of the success or failure of 
the keystone doctrine manuals produced by the 
Canadian Air Force since 1975.12 In a broader 
sense, the story of the early development of air 
power theory is closely related to the cultural 
aversion to written doctrine that has tradition-
ally characterised most Western air forces, 
including the Canadian Air Force. Given the 
historic roots of this aspect of air force culture, 
it is prudent to provide a brief overview of the 
early history of the theoretical development  
of air power.13
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Theory,	doctrine	and	the 
emergence	of	Western 
air Force Culture
During the First World War, aeroplanes 
were initially used by navies and especially 
armies to conduct reconnaissance and, in the 
case of armies, to locate artillery targets. 
Counter-reconnaissance efforts soon led to the 
addition of interception missions to the role of 
aircrews and the development of technology 
(such as forward-mounted machine guns)  
soon made aeroplanes much more effective 
at conducting air-to-air combat.14 Another 
important role soon added to the growing list 
of missions was aerial bombardment of ground 
forces, which led to the development of the 
concept of “strategic bombardment,” some-
thing that was to have a great impact on the 
development of air power theory in the decade 
following the end of the war. During the war 
itself, however, air power played a comparatively 
minor role, as it was overshadowed by the vast 
land and naval campaigns that were the war’s 
principal characteristics.15
Nevertheless, the development of air power 
during the war fuelled the early theories that 
gained traction in its aftermath. One of the key 
early proponents of air power was Italian Gen-
eral Giulio Douhet. His most influential work, 
The Command of the Air, was first published 
in 1921. “To have command of the air,” wrote 
Douhet, “means to be in a position to prevent 
the enemy from flying while retaining the 
ability to fly oneself.”16 More importantly than 
establishing this definition, Douhet asserted 
his belief that “[t]o conquer the command 
of the air means victory; to be beaten in the 
air means defeat and acceptance of whatever 
terms the enemy may be pleased to impose.”17 
Subsequently, he postulated that:
From this axiom we come immediately 
to this first corollary: In order to assure an 
adequate national defense, it is necessary – and 
sufficient – to be in a position in case of war 
to conquer the command of the air. And from 
that we arrive at this second corollary:  
All that a nation does to assure her own defense 
should have as its aim procuring for herself 
those means which, in case of war, are most 
effective for the conquest of the command of the 
air [emphasis in original].18
Furthermore, Douhet envisaged a key role 
for strategic bombardment in future warfare, 
reasoning that bombardment of targets within 
enemy territory would “cut off the enemy’s 
army and navy from their bases of operation, 
spread terror and havoc in the interior of his 
country, and break down the moral and physical 
resistance of his people.”19
Writing during the same period, other 
air power theorists made similar arguments, 
particularly regarding the potential effects of 
strategic bombardment. In the United States 
(US), Brigadier General William “Billy” 
Mitchell demonstrated the potential of air 
power at sea in 1921 by using aerial bombard-
ment to sink a captured German warship. 
In his writings, Mitchell advocated strategic 
bombardment as a means to win wars. Where 
he differed from Douhet, however, was that he 
did not advocate the use of air power to “spread 
terror and havoc” among a civilian population. 
Instead, he emphasised the strategic effect  
Italian General Giulio Douhet 
One of the key early proponents of air power.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:giulio_douhet.jpg
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bombardment would have on the enemy’s 
industrial and economic infrastructure and 
thus on his ability to sustain a war effort.20 In 
England, Lord Trenchard, inaugural Chief of 
the Air Staff of the Royal Air Force (RAF), 
argued that air power could be used to substi-
tute for land power in maintaining control over 
the colonies. The idea was tested with mixed 
success during the 1920s.21
At the time these theories were advanced, 
the strategic environment facing air forces was 
one of fiscal constraint and strong opposition 
to their existence by armies and navies. In 
England, the newly-established RAF had to 
frequently fight attempts by army and naval 
officers to reabsorb it back into their own 
services.22 In the US, the air force remained 
a part of the Army throughout the interwar 
years.23 In Canada, the Royal Canadian Air 
Force (RCAF) was inaugurated on April 1, 
1924, but remained a semi-autonomous branch 
within Militia Headquarters until 1938. A 
mixture of funding and political constraints 
prevented its independent development during 
the intervening period.24
The emergence during the 1920s and 1930s 
of the theoretical debate about command of 
the air and the potential of strategic bombard-
ment proved to be a “double-edged sword” 
for fledgling air forces. On one hand, the idea 
that air power could prove the decisive factor 
in future wars provided a potent argument for 
its advocates to justify its funding and, more 
importantly, the ongoing independence of air 
forces. On the other hand, the theories were of-
ten overstated and the concepts they developed 
were still, in some cases, decades ahead of what 
contemporary technology could achieve.25 As a 
result, the theories remained largely untested.26
The Second World War provided a testing 
ground for several of the theories developed in 
the early 1920s, initially yielding many disap-
pointing results for the advocates of strategic 
bombardment. Instead of having the effect 
of spreading “terror and havoc,” the bombing 
of London during the Blitz (1940-41) and of 
Germany from 1941 to 1943 had the overall 
effect of strengthening the resolve of civilian 
populations. “During the early years of World 
War II,” wrote Alan Stephens, “the apparent 
failure of strategic bombing to meet its sup-
porters’ claims damaged the credibility of air 
power generally.”27
The Second World War promoted the 
development of air power in a different 
way, however. The course of the war saw the 
development, application and refinement of 
most of air power’s contemporary roles. These 
included recognition of the importance of air 
supremacy,28 the development of close air sup-
port (CAS) to land forces, the role of aeroplanes 
in the protection of sea lines of communication 
and the development of tactics for air-to-air 
combat.29 Finally, the atomic bombs dropped 
on Japan at the close of the war reinvigorated 
the debate about the potential of strategic 
bombardment and whether or not the theory 
had gained a renewed applicability in the atomic 
age. As Mader asserted: “In sum, the Second 
World War witnessed the emergence of modern 
air power and laid the foundation for the broad 
spectrum of roles evolving in its aftermath.”30
Despite the many lessons the proponents 
of air power learned during the Second World 
War, the experience of the interwar period 
and the early stages of the war itself provoked 
widespread scepticism regarding the utility of 
written theory. The intense criticism that early 
air power theorists had attracted, the failure 
of strategic bombardment during the early 
part of the war and the ongoing gap between 
technology and theory (which, despite narrow-
ing, persisted to the war’s end) all combined 
to make most air force personnel reluctant to 
commit their thoughts to paper.31 Ongoing 
concerns about being absorbed back into armies 
and navies appear to have reinforced this aver-
sion, and the prospect of attracting unnecessary 
criticism from army and naval officers dis-
suaded many within air forces from recording 
theoretical developments. The result was that 
within Western air forces, including the  
RCAF, a strong oral (rather than written)  
tradition of passing lessons from senior to 
junior officers developed.32
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
SUMMER	2009	• VOL.	2,	NO.	3     THe	eMergeNCe	OF	A	“dOCTrINAL	CULTUre”	WITHIN	THe	CANAdIAN	AIr	FOrCe  43
...“the	apparent	failure	
of	strategic	bombing	
to	meet	its	supporters’	
claims	damaged	the	
credibility	of	air	power	
generally.”27
doctrine and Canadian air Force 
Culture	during	the	Cold	War
Prior to the Second World War, the RCAF 
based much of its organisational culture on that 
of the RAF, something that was reflected in its 
doctrine.33 Although a uniquely Canadian cul-
ture began to emerge during the Second World 
War, after the war this was quickly subsumed 
into a cultural realignment wherein RCAF 
culture came to mirror that of the USAF. The 
reasons for this cultural shift were summarised 
by Allan English:
Before the Second World War, the 
RCAF imitated its British counterpart 
in doctrine, ranks, and uniforms. By the 
Second World War, 
the “Canadianization” 
of overseas squadrons 
demanded by the public 
resulted in a gradual 
shift toward a more 
Canadian character in 
the RCAF overseas. At 
home, the British Com-
monwealth Air Training 
Plan not only perpetu-
ated a Canadian way 
of doing things among 
the majority of the RCAF [personnel] who 
remained on this side of the Atlantic, but it 
also exposed many British aircrew trainees to 
a Canadian culture very different from the 
culture they had come from in the United 
Kingdom. With the advent of the Cold War 
[sic] and its close association with the US 
Air Force in both NORAD and NATO, the 
RCAF (and later Canadian air force) came 
under the strong cultural influence of its 
neighbour to the south.34
Despite this cultural shift, the strong oral 
tradition that had already developed within the 
RCAF by the close of the Second World War 
was perpetuated by several trends that occurred 
during the cold war.
The first of these trends was the RCAF’s 
continued adoption of RAF and USAF tactical 
and operational doctrine (subject to its exis-
tence). In addition to constituting a disincentive 
to the development of an independent body of 
theory and doctrine within the Canadian Air 
Force, this practice arguably served to narrow 
the focus of many officers to operational and 
tactical issues, to the detriment of strategic 
thinking. As a result, the development of 
Canadian Air Force institutional strategy dur-
ing the cold war was not driven by, or related 
to, a strong theoretical framework. Instead, it 
appears that the primary strategic focus of the 
Air Force was achieving operational and tactical 
interoperability with the USAF in the context 
of the North American Aerospace Defense 
Command (NORAD) and with European al-
lies in the context of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO).35 
The lack of development 
of a theoretical framework 
to guide Canadian Air 
Force strategy was further 
compounded by the nature 
of the few RAF and USAF 
strategic publications avail-
able, almost all of which 
were not applicable to the 
Canadian Air Force since 
they related to the deploy-
ment of nuclear weapons 
that the Canadian Air Force did not possess.
Perhaps more detrimental, however, was the 
effect of the unification of the Canadian Forces 
(CF) in 1968. As discussed above, Western 
air forces had long been concerned about the 
possibility of being reabsorbed into armies and 
navies. For the RCAF, unification effectively 
had the same result; the fact that the RCAF 
was divided among the unified CF’s newly 
established “commands,” rather than between 
the army and navy, was merely a detail.36
Initially, the post-unification structure of the 
CF did not include an organisation exclusively 
responsible for applying air power because the 
former RCAF units were divided, in accordance 
with their primary function, among the CF’s 
six new “commands.” Maritime Command, 
for example, was assigned the former RCAF 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
44   THe	eMergeNCe	OF	A	“dOCTrINAL	CULTUre”	WITHIN	THe	CANAdIAN	AIr	FOrCe       SUMMER	2009	• VOL.	2,	NO.	3
anti-submarine and other maritime-based 
assets, Mobile Command the CAS assets 
and Air Transport Command the strategic 
and some tactical lift assets.37 Although the 
period of such stark division was short-lived 
(the amalgamation of Air Defence and Air 
Transport Commands into Air Command in 
1975, accompanied by the subsequent amal-
gamation of all other Canadian air assets into 
this new command, regardless of their primary 
function, provided a common foundation upon 
which an air force culture could be rebuilt),38 
it nonetheless had ongoing ramifications for 
doctrine development. One of these ramifica-
tions was the exacerbation of the existing focus 
on operational and (especially) tactical issues. 
Another was to heighten the prominence of 
capability-based “communities” within the 
Canadian Air Force.
In this context, the term “communities” 
refers to the different capability components 
that constitute an air force, or more accurately, 
to the attitudes of the individuals within their 
communities. Just as armies have corps and 
regiments and navies have different classes of 
ships to perform different roles, so too are air 
forces comprised of different components, each 
charged with performing a different primary 
role. Examples of air force communities based 
on these components include the personnel 
primarily involved with the flight and main-
tenance of “fast-jets” (mostly fighter aircraft), 
surveillance aircraft, helicopters, tactical (or 
battlefield) and strategic transport aircraft and 
so on. Furthermore, other communities exist 
that overlap these component-based groupings. 
These additional communities may be based 
on occupation (such as maintenance person-
nel, logisticians and pilots) or on the type of 
service an individual renders (such as Reserve 
or Regular service).39 Although these divisions 
exist in most air forces, in Canada unification 
had the effect of increasing the significance of 
the division between the air force’s capability-
based communities.
As will be discussed in more detail in the 
second part of this article, the heightened divi-
sion between the Canadian Air Force’s commu-
nities proved to be an additional impediment 
to the production of sound doctrine by the 
Canadian Air Force. This was for two reasons, 
the first being the natural inclination of each 
community to focus on the pragmatic and 
tactical elements of its role, to the detriment 
of broader strategic and theoretical thinking. 
The second was that the prominence of the Air 
Force’s communities generated and perpetuated 
a culture of “stovepiping.” (In general, stovepip-
ing is defined as “the condition that exists when 
staff or support personnel forget that they are 
subordinate to a line commander,” instead 
following instructions from higher up within 
the staff or support branch hierarchy.40 In the 
case of the Canadian Air Force, its stovepipes 
were divided along similar lines to its various 
capability-based community groups, with 
loyalties being directed upwards within  
each community.)41
Conclusion
By the end of the cold war, Canadian Air 
Force culture had long been characterised by 
a strong oral tradition, wherein ideas were 
verbally disseminated between officers. In 
addition to inhibiting professional writing by 
air force personnel (with the possible exception 
of those attending staff college), this aspect of 
Canadian Air Force culture was accompanied 
by a tendency to pragmatically focus on 
contemporary issues rather than the develop-
ment of broader theories and doctrines.
The roots of this aspect of Canadian Air 
Force culture lay in the early history of the 
theoretical development of air power. In 
particular, the intense criticism early air power 
theorists had attracted during the interwar 
period, and the early years of the Second World 
War served as a deterrent to many air force 
personnel, who became strongly reluctant to 
commit their thoughts to paper. Furthermore, 
the existing propensity of Canadian Air Force 
personnel to eschew written theory and doc-
trine was compounded by several trends during 
the cold war. These included the Canadian Air 
Force’s adoption of RAF and USAF doctrine 
manuals in lieu of domestic doctrine develop-
ment as well as the ramifications of the CF’s 
unification in 1968.
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Despite this aspect of its culture, there was 
still a minority within the Canadian Air Force 
who were willing to experiment with doctrine 
development. Following the formation of 
Air Command in 1975, momentum behind 
doctrine development gradually grew within 
the Air Force. The history of this development, 
and how it has interacted with the Air Force’s 
doctrinally adverse culture, will be the subject 
of the second part of this article. n
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